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Nothing shows better than this need of adaptation and mediation and reconciliation everywhere, how shaky the whole edifice of philosophy was at that time, and how circumstances called imperatively for a man who would start thinkers on a new path: Kant.

The chapter on the relations of Béguelin with the principal men of the Académie Royale of Berlin is neither very interesting nor very important, but that on Béguelin and Kant is the one which shows best the critical abilities of Dumont.

In fine, I should say that the book is by no means worthless. Béguelin's philosophy has hardly much value in itself, but as illustrating the spirit of a period it is worth studying. A small philosopher reflects just as faithfully as a great thinker his own time; only he reflects it more naïvely.

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The Limits of Educability in Paramecium. STEVENSON SMITH. *The Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology,* 1908, Vol. XVIII., No. 5.

Students of comparative psychology will welcome this excellent piece of experimentation as a real contribution to the field of adaptive behavior of microorganisms. It is argued here that careful animal studies reveal an adaptive phylogenetic development from unicellular organisms upwards without involving consciousness in the description. Even memory, which has been held by some to be a conscious adaptation, may involve no consciousness whatever, even though it may possess for the organism strong selective qualities. Inorganic manifolds portray some of the same memory characters that we find in the organic.

An adaptive behavior in organisms must develop of necessity if the ordinary laws of evolution are granted. It is true that we have memory here, but there is no evidence that it is conscious.

The criterion of consciousness assumed by Morgan and others, namely, that the organism shall be able to profit by past experience, is rejected by Professor Smith as being inadequate on the ground that much profit by experience in man is not at all a conscious adaptation. For example, muscular adaptation which is profitable to new conditions does not make the muscle a "conscious mechanism," but is simply the establishment in it of more ready reactive tendencies. Aside from the development of facility, there is the acquirement of selective movements by animals. This may be explained by the selection of overproduced movements, and the author offers a formula describing this selection in terms of chance and habit.

The teleological aspect of vital reactions has led some speculators to fix upon regulation as the criterion of consciousness, involving, as it usually does, choice of conditions. But upon analysis it is shown that "we may call behavior regulatory when a process having proceeded too far is the cause of its own remedy." In demonstration of this, certain examples are given of regulation in the field of inorganic manifolds. The regulation of living things differs from inorganic self-regulatory actions in that after the action is completed, the reversion to the normal state in the former is more perfect, which renders the organism ready at once for a fresh corrective adaptation, should the need arise. This definition becomes at once a contribution, as the outline of an adequate description of regulatory behavior is suggested which involves no super-organic terms.

The experiments cited in this paper were made upon paramecium to determine the character of the modifiability of action when recurring stimuli of the same kind were given. They fall into three groups: (1) Those in which the animal was stimulated by touch (the meniscus of a capillary tube), the conditions being such that it could react in but two ways in order to escape. (2) Those in which the animal was stimulated by change in temperature. (3) Those in which the animal was frequently made to experience two conditions, which at first occurred simultaneously, and later made to experience one alone, any difference being noted between the reactions to the first and the second conditions.

These experiments seem to have been performed with great care and accuracy. In the first experiment the animal was placed in a capillary tube of a bore less than the length of the paramecium and greater than its width. In time the animal acquires the ability to twist around and to reverse its direction in the tube. This aptitude, under optimum conditions, progresses until the paramecium may reduce the time for making the turn from four or five minutes to a couple of seconds. The second and third groups of experiments, which were performed as a test for associative memory, gave entirely negative results.

In conclusion the author says: "Paramecium is educable in that its behavior may be modified to show the results of practise, both in a reduction of the time involved in performing a movement and in the increase in suitability of the movement to accomplish the appropriate result. In so far as the above tests apply, there is no evidence of associative memory in paramecium. The reversing movement above described is in the nature of a positive reaction."

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. March, 1909. *Naturalisme, humanisme et philosophie des valeurs* (pp. 225-255): A. CHIAPPELLI. - Modern philosophy exhibits a great Idealistic regeneration in which philosophy is differentiating itself from science, not by degree of generality, but by a difference of its object—an historical conception of universal nature, at once ideal and evaluative. *L'antipathie dans ses rapports avec le caractère* (pp. 156-275): L. DUGAS. - A development of Ribot's idea that antipathy is a form of the instinct of self-preservation. *L'idée de dieu et le principe d'assimilation intellectuelle* pp. (276-284): A. LALANDE. - A criticism of a paper by M. Belot on *La triple origine de l'idée de dieu* in the December number of this JOURNAL. *Revue générale. Philosophie du*